The introduction of new varieties of goods increases welfare under certainty and perfect competition. However, when the quality of new goods is uncertain, the need for a regulatory regime on liabilities and hazards arises. We examine the optimality of the regulatory mechanisms of quality under ambiguity (non-uniqueness of the probability distribution). We develop a model showing that product liability does not lead to optimality under ambiguity and so it constitutes an inadequate instrument for controlling the potential damages caused by innovative products. The level of precaution will be larger, equal or less than the optimal level and will decrease with the degree of optimism and will increase with the degree of pessimism. Consequently the price will not reflect the actual product risk and consumers will buy either an insufficient or an excessive amount, according to the case. We present some considerations on the adequate institutional design, capturing the insights obtained in the comparison between regulatory regimes.

中文翻译：

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模糊性下的产品责任

在确定性和完全竞争下，新品种商品的引入增加了福利。但是，当不确定新商品的质量时，就需要制定有关责任和危害的监管制度。我们研究在不确定性（概率分布的非唯一性）下质量调节机制的最优性。我们开发了一个模型，该模型表明产品责任并不会在歧义下导致最优，因此，它不足以控制创新产品可能造成的损害。预防措施的级别将大于，等于或小于最佳级别，并且随着乐观程度的降低而降低，并且随着悲观程度的提高而提高。因此，根据情况，价格将不能反映实际的产品风险，并且消费者会购买不足或过量的商品。我们对适当的机构设计提出了一些考虑，以获取在监管制度之间进行比较时获得的见解。