In the absence of well-developed financial markets, bankruptcy procedures provide useful mechanisms to ease and organize the capital transfers of distressed businesses. From an investor’s perspective, such court-supervised ways of solving financial distress are part of the attractiveness of the post-transition economies that eventually integrated the European Union. This article originally analyzes the content of bankruptcy files handled by the courts operating in three Eastern European countries: Hungary, Poland, and Romania. Our approach mostly focuses on the two fundamental issues that bankruptcy courts must solve when the question of repayments arises: (1) maximizing and (2) sharing the debtor’s value. We first find that the investors’ recovery power strongly depends on the local rules prevailing after bankruptcy filing (legal indexes) and on the type of procedure engaged (reorganization vs. liquidation). Second, total recoveries do not benefit from the presence of public claims suggesting some passivity from the state, in the context of post-transition. Conversely, junior creditors exert a positive influence on total recoveries despite their poor legal protection, which contrasts with secured creditors (confirming the bad incentives that collaterals may generate). In addition, as in Western Europe, the Eastern European bankruptcy systems provide stronger protection for private secured claims than for public claims.

中文翻译：

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转型后经济体中的破产程序

在没有发达的金融市场的情况下，破产程序提供了缓解和组织不良企业资金转移的有用机制。从投资者的角度来看，这种由法院监督的解决财务危机的方法是最终融入欧盟的过渡后经济体吸引力的一部分。本文最初分析了东欧三个国家（匈牙利，波兰和罗马尼亚）运作的法院处理的破产文件的内容。我们的方法主要关注破产法院在还款问题出现时必须解决的两个基本问题：（1）最大化和（2）共享债务人的价值。我们首先发现，投资者的恢复能力在很大程度上取决于申请破产后的当地法规（法律指标）和所采用的程序类型（重组与清算）。第二，在过渡后的背景下，总回收额不会因公共索赔的存在而受益，这表明政府对国家有些消极。相反，初级债权人尽管法律保护薄弱，但对总回收额有积极影响，这与有担保债权人形成鲜明对比（确认抵押品可能产生不良激励）。此外，与西欧一样，东欧的破产制度为私人担保债权提供了比公共债权更强的保护。在过渡后的背景下，总回收额不会因公共索赔的存在而受益，这表明政府对该州有所消极。相反，初级债权人尽管法律保护薄弱，但对总回收额有积极影响，这与有担保债权人形成鲜明对比（确认抵押品可能产生不良激励）。此外，与西欧一样，东欧的破产制度为私人担保债权提供了比公共债权更强的保护。在过渡后的背景下，总回收额不会因公共索赔的存在而受益，这表明政府对该州有所消极。相反，初级债权人尽管法律保护薄弱，但对总回收额有积极影响，这与有担保债权人形成鲜明对比（确认抵押品可能产生不良激励）。此外，与西欧一样，东欧的破产制度为私人担保债权提供了比公共债权更强的保护。