This paper explores how consumers’ moral and image concerns influence the equilibrium in a product-accident model in which third parties incur harm. We differentiate results according to whether the product is supplied by a monopolistic firm or competitive ones. Assuming incomplete compensation of third parties, we find that both moral and image concerns of consumers increase product safety in the context of a competitive market, while the monopolist’s product safety level varies exclusively with consumers’ morality. Comparing market outcomes, we find that the monopolist’s product safety levels may induce greater welfare than a competitive industry.

中文翻译：

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与第三方的产品事故中的责任，道德和形象问题

本文探讨了消费者的道德和形象关注如何影响第三方造成损害的产品事故模型中的均衡。我们根据产品是由垄断企业提供还是由竞争性企业提供来区分结果。假设对第三方的补偿不完全，我们发现在竞争性市场的背景下，消费者的道德和形象关注都提高了产品安全性，而垄断者的产品安全水平则完全取决于消费者的道德。比较市场结果，我们发现垄断者的产品安全级别可能比竞争性行业带来更大的福利。