Various corporate law and governance theories inform us that board independence, management ownership and blockholder ownership are important elements of the overall corporate governance system. The empirical evidence on the effectiveness of these elements is, however, mixed at best. Moreover, the results and conclusions of prior theoretical and empirical research are typically country-specific and often not universally applicable. The empirical analysis conducted in this article is based on a panel data set consisting of 43 large public companies over a time frame of 6 years in the context of the small and open economy of Switzerland. The results of this analysis suggest that a larger fraction of independent directors on the company board decreases firm value and that a combined leadership structure may also increase value. Similarly, the results suggest that the presence of a controlling shareholder decreases firm value and that the presence of institutional investors as significant shareholders may also decrease value. The new evidence of this country study casts doubt on several generally accepted good corporate governance principles and highlights the need for a reconsideration of public policy towards board governance and blockholder governance. This article examines and discusses the most relevant policy implications based on the new evidence.

中文翻译：

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董事会组成、所有权结构和公司价值：来自瑞士的经验证据

各种公司法和治理理论告诉我们，董事会独立性、管理层所有权和股东所有权是整个公司治理体系的重要组成部分。然而，关于这些要素有效性的经验证据充其量是混合的。此外，先前理论和实证研究的结果和结论通常是针对特定国家的，通常并不普遍适用。本文中进行的实证分析基于一个面板数据集，该数据集由 43 家大型上市公司在 6 年的时间框架内在瑞士小型开放经济体的背景下进行。这一分析的结果表明，公司董事会中较大比例的独立董事会降低公司价值，而联合领导结构也可能会增加价值。相似地，结果表明，控股股东的存在会降低公司价值，而机构投资者作为重要股东的存在也可能会降低公司价值。这项国家研究的新证据对几项普遍接受的良好公司治理原则提出了质疑，并强调了重新考虑董事会治理和大股东治理的公共政策的必要性。本文根据新证据检查并讨论了最相关的政策含义。这项国家研究的新证据对几项普遍接受的良好公司治理原则提出了质疑，并强调了重新考虑董事会治理和大股东治理的公共政策的必要性。本文根据新证据检查并讨论了最相关的政策含义。这项国家研究的新证据对几项普遍接受的良好公司治理原则提出了质疑，并强调了重新考虑董事会治理和大股东治理的公共政策的必要性。本文根据新证据检查并讨论了最相关的政策含义。