This paper argues that the failed attempt to introduce a mandatory board neutrality rule into EU takeover law was an object lesson that it is difficult to enact rules that are contrary to the corporate law cultures of the majority of the Member States. It provides an account of key factors that prevented enacting a mandatory board neutrality rule in the EU: varying takeover laws and practices; conflicting management and shareholder interests; divide between exhaustive and minimum harmonisation; and varying market orientation models. It argues that as long as there are varied national corporate laws, most EU corporate law rules are bound to remain categorised as optional, unimportant, or avoidable.

中文翻译：

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欧盟董事会中立规则的历史终结

本文认为，将强制性董事会中立规则引入欧盟收购法的尝试失败是一个客观教训，即很难制定与大多数成员国的公司法文化相悖的规则。它提供了阻止在欧盟颁布强制性董事会中立规则的关键因素的说明：不同的收购法律和做法；冲突的管理层和股东利益；彻底协调和最低限度协调之间的区别；以及不同的市场导向模型。它认为，只要存在不同的国家公司法，大多数欧盟公司法规则必然仍被归类为可选的、不重要的或可避免的。