In its 1999 Centros decision, the European Court of Justice affirmed that the EU right of establishment protects a corporation’s right to select a state of incorporation. Specifically, Centros rejected the argument that, under the real seat doctrine, the country in which the corporation’s head office is located may deny recognition or apply domestic corporate law to a corporation that is validly formed in another EU state. At the time, commentators broadly viewed Centros as opening the door to greater regulatory competition in Europe. Twenty years later, we examine Centros through the lens of SB 826—the California statute mandating a minimum number of women on boards. SB 826, like Centros, raises questions about the extent to which a forum state, as opposed to the state of incorporation, can impose its laws on corporations that operate within its borders. In the US, these questions are typically addressed by application of the internal affairs doctrine which provides that the law of the state of incorporation applies to the corporation’s internal affairs. Both SB 826 and Centros thus highlight the critical importance of the scope of the internal affairs doctrine. In this article, we stress the importance of the shareholder primacy norm to understanding the scope of US corporate law, which results in corporate law focusing primarily on matters of shareholder economic interest. We argue that the internal affairs doctrine should be understood within the context of the shareholder primacy norm and therefore directed to rules oriented to enhancing firm economic value. Considered in this context, SB 826 is distinctive in that it focuses on broader societal interests than traditional corporate law. In the same vein, EU corporate law has traditionally had a broader stakeholder orientation. We posit that the limited impact of the Centros decision, an impact which differed significantly from its predicted revolutionary effect, can be attributed to the greater focus of EU corporate law on social ordering and a more limited adherence to the shareholder primacy norm. Ironically, California’s adoption of SB 826 may portend a movement of the US towards Centros-style governance.

中文翻译：

---

Centros，加利福尼亚州的“女性董事会”法规和监管竞争的范围

在其 1999 年 Centros 裁决中，欧洲法院确认欧盟设立权保护公司选择注册地的权利。具体而言，Centros 驳回了以下论点，即根据真实席位原则，公司总部所在的国家/地区可能会拒绝承认或将国内公司法适用于在另一个欧盟国家有效成立的公司。当时，评论家普遍认为 Centros 为欧洲更大的监管竞争打开了大门。20 年后，我们通过 SB 826 的视角审视 Centros——加州法规要求董事会中的女性人数最少。SB 826 与 Centros 一样，也提出了一个问题，即一个论坛状态，而不是公司注册状态，可以将其法律强加于在其境内经营的公司。在美国，这些问题通常是通过适用内部事务原则来解决的，该原则规定公司成立地的法律适用于公司的内部事务。因此，SB 826 和 Centros 都强调了内政原则范围的极端重要性。在本文中，我们强调股东至上规范对理解美国公司法范围的重要性，这导致公司法主要关注股东经济利益问题。我们认为，应在股东至上规范的背景下理解内部事务原则，因此应针对旨在提高公司经济价值的规则。在这种情况下考虑，SB 826 的独特之处在于它关注比传统公司法更广泛的社会利益。同样，欧盟公司法传统上具有更广泛的利益相关者导向。我们假设 Centros 决定的影响有限，这种影响与其预测的革命性影响显着不同，可归因于欧盟公司法对社会秩序的更大关注以及对股东至上规范的更有限的遵守。具有讽刺意味的是，加利福尼亚州采用 SB 826 可能预示着美国将转向 Centros 式治理。这种影响与其预测的革命性影响大相径庭，可归因于欧盟公司法更加关注社会秩序，以及对股东至上规范的遵守更为有限。具有讽刺意味的是，加利福尼亚州采用 SB 826 可能预示着美国将转向 Centros 式治理。这种影响与其预测的革命性影响大相径庭，可归因于欧盟公司法更加关注社会秩序，以及对股东至上规范的遵守更为有限。具有讽刺意味的是，加利福尼亚州采用 SB 826 可能预示着美国将转向 Centros 式治理。