This article analyzes market reaction to the introduction into Italian legislation of a statutory system of (IPO) prospectus civil liability enacted in April 2007 on the basis of Directive 2003/71/EC. In particular, we study the effects of the new regulation on gatekeepers, such as underwriters and auditors who are commonly qualified as information intermediaries. We analyse the effects on average underpricing, fees charged by the underwriters, syndicate composition and reputation, and auditor participation. Although we find only weak statistical evidence that the level of underpricing has increased after April 2007, there is a statistically significant tendency to have one of the Big Four auditors in post-April 2007 IPOs, with lower participation of international banks in syndication and sharing of prospectus liability. Moreover, after April 2007 we observe an increase in the reputation of the underwriters acting as responsabile del collocamento with lower underwriters’ fees charged.

中文翻译：

---

招股说明书责任和看门人作为信息中介的作用：法定条款对意大利 IPO 影响的实证分析

本文分析了市场对 2007 年 4 月根据 2003/71/EC 指令颁布的（IPO）招股说明书民事责任法定制度引入意大利立法的反应。我们特别研究了新法规对守门人的影响，例如通常具有信息中介资格的承销商和审计师。我们分析了对平均抑价、承销商收取的费用、辛迪加组成和声誉以及审计师参与的影响。尽管我们只发现了弱统计证据表明 2007 年 4 月之后抑价水平有所上升，但在 2007 年 4 月之后的 IPO 中，有四大审计师之一的统计显着趋势，国际银行参与银团和共享的比例较低招股说明书责任。而且，