Is there a correlation between the composition of the board of directors and the quantity and quality of information disclosed to the market, and in particular with respect to the disclosure of privileged, price-sensitive information? Our work examines this question with respect to the Italian Stock Exchange, also considering the role of minority-appointed directors in light of the Italian rules on slate voting that facilitate the election of directors by institutional investors and other minority shareholders. Based on a unique dataset of hand-picked data, we answer the basic research question in the affirmative. Independent directors and minority-appointed directors appear to have a positive impact on the amount and, to some extent, quality of disclosure, in particular if they have specific professional and educational qualifications (‘highly skilled directors’). We also tested if the market reacts to the information that is made public in order to consider the possible objection that outside directors simply require more disclosure of unimportant information. The event studies we conducted, however, indicate abnormal returns in the correspondence on the announcements we considered. The study sheds light on the role of independent and minority-appointed directors suggesting that they foster corporate transparency.

中文翻译：

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披露董事

董事会的组成与向市场披露的信息的数量和质量之间是否存在相关性，尤其是在披露特权、价格敏感信息方面？我们的工作研究了与意大利证券交易所有关的这个问题，同时考虑了少数派任命的董事的作用，因为意大利有利于机构投资者和其他少数股东选举董事的石板投票规则。基于精选数据的独特数据集，我们肯定地回答了基础研究问题。独立董事和少数派董事似乎对披露的数量和质量产生积极影响，特别是如果他们具有特定的专业和教育资格（“高技能董事”）。我们还测试了市场是否对公开的信息做出反应，以考虑可能的反对意见，即外部董事只是要求更多地披露不重要的信息。然而，我们进行的事件研究表明，我们所考虑的公告的通信出现了异常回报。该研究阐明了独立董事和少数派任命的董事的作用，表明他们促进了公司透明度。在我们考虑的公告的通信中表明异常回报。该研究阐明了独立董事和少数派任命的董事的作用，表明他们促进了公司透明度。在我们考虑的公告的通信中表明异常回报。该研究阐明了独立董事和少数派任命的董事的作用，表明他们促进了公司透明度。