当前位置: X-MOL 学术Econ. Gov. › 论文详情
Our official English website, www.x-mol.net, welcomes your feedback! (Note: you will need to create a separate account there.)
Step-by-step group contests with group-specific public-good prizes
Economics of Governance ( IF 0.781 ) Pub Date : 2019-03-18 , DOI: 10.1007/s10101-019-00224-4
Katsuya Kobayashi

The achievements reached by group members’ effort, which accompanies the possibility of members’ free-riding, affect the outcomes of competition among groups. In some cases, each achievement has the binary characteristic of “one or nothing.” For example, research groups face the challenge of making a scientific finding or not. The groups compete for a scientific breakthrough by making the related findings in a “step-by-step” manner. One finding could fail because of a mistake caused by a slight lack of effort by one member. Such a characteristic of “one or nothing” motivates group members without any incentive scheme. This study analyzes group contests with group-specific public-good prizes, in which we introduce a step function with the characteristics of “one or nothing” and “step-by-step” as a group impact function. We show the existence of the Nash equilibrium at which no group member free-rides on the others and at which more achievements than those reachable by a single member are reached.

中文翻译:

分阶段进行的团体竞赛,包括针对特定群体的公益奖品

小组成员努力所取得的成就,伴随着成员搭便车的可能性,影响了小组之间竞争的结果。在某些情况下,每个成就都具有“一个或没有”的二元特征。例如,研究小组面临着做出或不做出科学发现的挑战。这些小组以“循序渐进”的方式做出相关发现,以争取科学突破。一个发现可能由于一个成员略微缺乏努力而导致的错误而失败。这种“一个或什么都不做”的特征在没有任何激励机制的情况下激励了小组成员。这项研究分析了具有特定群体公益性奖品的团体竞赛,其中我们引入了具有“一个或一个”和“逐步”作为团队影响功能的阶梯函数。
更新日期:2019-03-18
down
wechat
bug