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Weighted voting on the IMF Managing Director
Economics of Governance ( IF 0.781 ) Pub Date : 2020-07-27 , DOI: 10.1007/s10101-020-00240-9
Alexander Mayer , Stefan Napel

Executive Directors of the International Monetary Fund elect the Fund’s Managing Director from a shortlist of three candidates; financial quotas of IMF members define the respective numbers of votes. The implied a priori distribution of success (preference satisfaction) is compared across different electoral procedures. The USA’s Executive Director can expect to come closer to its top preference under plurality rule than for pairwise majority comparisons or plurality with a runoff; opposite applies to everybody else. Differences of US success between voting rules dominate the within-rule differences between most other Directors, and much of the latest reform of quotas.



中文翻译:

对IMF董事总经理的加权投票

国际货币基金组织的执行董事从三名候选人的候选人名单中选出该基金的董事总经理。基金组织成员的财政配额确定了各自的票数。隐含的成功先验分布(优先满足)将在不同的选举程序中进行比较。与成对多数比较或具有收益的多数相比,美国执行董事可以期望在多元规则下更接近其最优先选择。相反适用于其他所有人。美国在投票规则上的成功差异主导了大多数其他董事之间的内部规则差异,以及多数最新的配额改革。

更新日期:2020-07-27
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