An important question in representative democracies is how to ensure that politicians behave in the best interest of citizens rather than their own private interests. Aside from elections, one of the few institutional devices available to regulate the actions of politicians is their pay structure. In this paper, we provide fresh insights into the impact of politician salaries on their performance using a unique law change implemented in 2012 in Turkey. Specifically, the members of the parliament (MPs) in Turkey who are retired from their pre-political career jobs earn a pension bonus on top of their MP salaries. The law change in 2012 significantly increased the pension bonus by pegging it to 18 percent of the salary of the President of Turkey, while keeping the salaries of non-retired MPs unchanged. By exploiting the variation in total salaries caused by the new law in a difference-in-differences framework, we find that the salary increase had a negative impact on the performance of the retired MPs. In particular, the overall performance of these MPs was lowered by 12.3 percent of a standard deviation as a result of the increase in salary caused by the new law. This finding is robust to numerous specification tests. Furthermore, the results obtained from an auxiliary analysis suggest that one of the mechanisms through which MPs reduce their performance is through absenteeism.

中文翻译：

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政治家的报酬方式和报酬是否重要？

代议制民主的一个重要问题是如何确保政治家的行为符合公民的最佳利益，而不是他们自己的私人利益。除了选举之外，可用来规范政客行为的少数制度手段之一是他们的薪酬结构。在本文中，我们使用 2012 年在土耳其实施的独特法律变更，提供了有关政治家薪水对其绩效影响的新见解。具体而言，土耳其议会议员（MPs）从政治前的职业工作中退休，除了他们的议员工资外，还能获得养老金奖金。2012 年的法律变更通过将其与土耳其总统工资的 18% 挂钩而显着增加了养老金奖金，同时保持未退休国会议员的工资不变。通过在差异框架中利用新法律引起的总工资变化，我们发现加薪对退休议员的表现产生了负面影响。特别是，这些议员的整体表现由于新法导致的加薪而降低了 12.3% 的标准差。这一发现对众多规格测试是稳健的。此外，从辅助分析中获得的结果表明，国会议员降低绩效的机制之一是缺勤。由于新法律导致工资增加，标准差的 3%。这一发现对众多规格测试是稳健的。此外，从辅助分析中获得的结果表明，国会议员降低绩效的机制之一是缺勤。由于新法律导致工资增加，标准差的 3%。这一发现对众多规格测试是稳健的。此外，从辅助分析中获得的结果表明，国会议员降低绩效的机制之一是缺勤。