In the absence of a public safety net, wealthy Africans have the social obligation to share their re- sources with their needy relatives in the form of cash transfers and inefficient family hiring. We develop a model of entrepreneurial choice that accounts for this social redistributive constraint. We derive pre- dictions regarding employment choices, productivity, and profitability of firms ran by entrepreneurs of African versus non-African origin. Everything else equal, local firms are over-staffed and less productive than firms owned by nonlocals, which discourages local entrepreneurship. Using data from the manu- facturing sector, we illustrate the theory by structurally estimating the proportion of missing African entrepreneurs. Our estimates, which are suggestive due to the data limitation, vary between 8% and 12.6% of the formal sector workforce. Implications for the role of social protection are discussed.

中文翻译：

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社会压力是否阻碍了非洲的创业？强制互助假说

在没有公共安全网的情况下，富有的非洲人有社会义务以现金转移和低效家庭雇用的形式与有需要的亲戚分享他们的资源。我们开发了一个创业选择模型，解释了这种社会再分配约束。我们对非洲裔企业家和非非洲裔企业家经营的公司的就业选择、生产力和盈利能力进行了预测。在其他条件相同的情况下，本地公司人员过多且生产力低于非本地人拥有的公司，这阻碍了本地创业。使用来自制造业的数据，我们通过结构性估计失踪非洲企业家的比例来说明该理论。由于数据限制，我们的估计值在 8% 到 12% 之间变化。6% 的正规部门劳动力。讨论了对社会保护作用的影响。