On 24 November 2015, the European Commission published a proposal to establish a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS). The proposal provides for the creation of a Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) with a target size of 0.8% of covered deposits in the euro area and the progressive mutualisation of its resources until a fully-fledged scheme is introduced by 2024. This paper investigates the potential impact and appropriateness of several features of EDIS in the steady state. The main findings are the following: first, a fully-funded DIF would be sufficient to cover payouts even in a severe banking crisis. Second, risk-based contributions can and should internalise specificities of banks and banking systems. This would tackle moral hazard and facilitate moving forward with risk sharing measures towards the completion of the Banking Union in parallel with risk reduction measures; this approach would also be preferable to lowering the target level of the DIF to take into account banking system specificities. Third, smaller and larger banks would not excessively contribute to EDIS relative to the amount of covered deposits in their balance sheet. Fourth, there would be no unwarranted systematic cross-subsidisation within EDIS in the sense of some banking systems systematically contributing less than they would benefit from the DIF. This result holds also when country-specific shocks are simulated. Fifth, under a mixed deposit insurance scheme composed of national deposit insurance funds bearing the first burden and a European deposit insurance fund intervening only afterwards, cross-subsidisation would increase relative to a fully-fledged EDIS. The key drivers behind these results are: i) a significant risk-reduction in the banking system and increase in banks' loss-absorbing capacity in the aftermath of the global financial crisis; ii) a super priority for covered deposits, further contributing to protect EDIS; iii) an appropriate design of risk-based contributions, benchmarked at the euro area level, following a "polluter-pays" approach. JEL Classification: G21, G28

中文翻译：

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用欧洲存款保险计划完善银行联盟：谁怕交叉补贴？

2015年11月24日，欧盟委员会发布了建立欧洲存款保险计划（EDIS）的提案。该提案提议建立一个存款保险基金（DIF），目标规模是欧元区涵盖存款的0.8％，并逐步实现其资源的共同化，直到2024年推出成熟的计划。稳定状态下EDIS某些功能的潜在影响和适用性。主要发现如下：首先，即使在严重的银行危机中，资金充足的DIF也足以支付支出。第二，基于风险的捐款可以而且应该内化银行和银行系统的特殊性。这将解决道德风险，并促进采取风险分担措施，与减少风险措施同时实现银行联盟的完成；考虑到银行系统的特殊性，这种方法也比降低DIF的目标水平更好。第三，规模较小的银行相对于资产负债表中的已担保存款而言，不会对EDIS贡献过多。第四，就某些银行系统的系统性贡献不足以从DIF中受益的意义而言，在EDIS中不会存在不必要的系统交叉补贴。当模拟特定国家的冲击时，该结果也成立。第五，根据由首当其冲的国家存款保险基金和后来才介入的欧洲存款保险基金组成的混合存款保险计划，相对于成熟的EDIS，交叉补贴将增加。这些结果背后的主要驱动力是：i）在全球金融危机之后，银行系统的风险大大减少，银行的亏损吸收能力增强；ii）覆盖存款的优先事项，进一步有助于保护EDIS；iii）按照“污染者付费”的方法，以欧元区为基准，适当设计基于风险的捐款。JEL分类：G21，G28 i）在全球金融危机之后，银行系统的风险大大减少，银行的亏损吸收能力增强；ii）覆盖存款的优先事项，进一步有助于保护EDIS；iii）按照“污染者付费”的方法，以欧元区为基准，适当设计基于风险的捐款。JEL分类：G21，G28 i）在全球金融危机之后，银行系统的风险大大减少，银行的亏损吸收能力增强；ii）覆盖存款的优先事项，进一步有助于保护EDIS；iii）按照“污染者付费”的方法，以欧元区为基准，适当设计基于风险的捐款。JEL分类：G21，G28