ABSTRACT This paper investigates the relationship between political corruption and land market outcomes. Three rounds of parliamentary elections in Ukraine are analyzed from 2002 to 2010. Evidence of rental rates for land being higher in districts that exhibit greater electoral support for parties that form the parliamentary opposition after the elections is found. On the other hand, average rental rates are lower in pro-majority districts that give evidence of clientelistic relations being formed in certain regions of Ukraine as well as state capture in the land market.

中文翻译：

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乌克兰的客户主义和土地市场结果

摘要 本文研究了政治腐败与土地市场结果之间的关系。分析了 2002 年至 2010 年乌克兰的三轮议会选举。证据表明，在选举后对构成议会反对派的政党表现出更大选举支持的地区，土地租金率较高。另一方面，亲多数地区的平均租金较低，这表明在乌克兰的某些地区形成了客户关系以及土地市场中的国家捕获。