The nature of the Treaty provisions on EU external action, with a set of open-ended policy objectives and fewer policy-directed legal obligations on the Member States, has left much to the agenda-setting of the political institutions. The Court of Justice emphasises the need for the institutions to retain their discretion, their room for manoeuvre; it is non-interventionist, tending to take those choices at face value without seeking to define or shape them. Instead it has taken on another role: it ensures that the institutions act within their powers, and that the Member States do not obstruct the formation and implementation of Union policy. It is in fact engaged in establishing and protecting an institutional space within which policy may be formed, in which the different actors understand and work within their respective roles. The principles which have been drawn from the Treaties and elaborated by the Court to establish this institutional space are identified here as ‘structural principles’. They include the duty of sincere cooperation, the principles of conferral and institutional balance, mutual solidarity, subsidiarity, and the principle of autonomy. By identifying and developing these principles, which by their nature are flexible and capable of evolution, the Court of Justice exercises a formidable role in the governance of EU external action despite its hands-off approach to substantive policy choice. This paper seeks to explore further the nature of these structural principles as legal norms. It first offers an explanation for the importance of structural principles in the EU’s external relations by exploring the nature of EU external relations powers. Second it begins an enquiry into the nature of structural principles: what does it mean to say that they are principles, that they are structural, and that they operate within external relations? Third, it offers a tentative typology of structural principles and some ideas on the ways in which they may complement and operate in tension with each other. * European University Institute © The Author 2016. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Faculty of Laws, University College London. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com

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结构性原则及其在欧盟对外关系法中的作用

条约关于欧盟对外行动的规定的性质，具有一系列开放式政策目标和成员国较少的政策导向的法律义务，为政治机构的议程设置留下了很多余地。法院强调机构需要保留其自由裁量权和回旋余地；它是不干涉主义者，倾向于从表面上选择这些选择，而不寻求定义或塑造它们。相反，它扮演了另一个角色：它确保机构在其权力范围内行事，并且成员国不会阻碍联盟政策的形成和实施。事实上，它致力于建立和保护一个可以形成政策的制度空间，不同的参与者在其中理解并在各自的角色内工作。从条约中汲取并由法院为建立这种制度空间而制定的原则在此被称为“结构性原则”。它们包括真诚合作的义务、授予和制度平衡的原则、相互团结、从属和自治的原则。通过确定和发展这些本质上灵活且能够演变的原则，法院尽管对实质性政策选择采取了不干涉的态度，但在欧盟对外行动的治理中发挥了强大的作用。本文旨在进一步探讨这些结构性原则作为法律规范的性质。首先通过探讨欧盟对外关系权力的性质，解释结构性原则在欧盟对外关系中的重要性。其次，它开始探究结构性原则的性质：说它们是原则，它们是结构性的，并且它们在外部关系中起作用是什么意思？第三，它提供了结构原则的暂定类型学和关于它们可以相互补充和相互紧张运作的方式的一些想法。* 欧洲大学研究所 © The Author 2016。由牛津大学出版社代表伦敦大学学院法学院出版。版权所有。如需权限，请发送电子邮件至：journals.permissions@oup.com 它提供了结构原则的初步类型学和关于它们可以相互补充和相互紧张运作的方式的一些想法。* 欧洲大学研究所 © The Author 2016。由牛津大学出版社代表伦敦大学学院法学院出版。版权所有。如需权限，请发送电子邮件至：journals.permissions@oup.com 它提供了结构原则的暂定类型学和关于它们可以相互补充和相互紧张运作的方式的一些想法。* 欧洲大学研究所 © The Author 2016。由牛津大学出版社代表伦敦大学学院法学院出版。版权所有。如需权限，请发送电子邮件至：journals.permissions@oup.com