This study investigates the effect of political promotion incentives on the labor investment efficiency of firms by focusing on human capital misallocation. We show that 1) promotion incentives of local politicians significantly increase firm-level employment growth and decrease labor investment efficiency. 2) Causality is established using the number of death toll in local mining accidents to isolate exogenous shocks on the promotion incentives of local politicians, and placebo tests further confirm the causality. 3) For under-hiring firms, promotion incentives only increase the employment of low human capital, thus distorting human capital structure and decreasing labor investment efficiency. 4) Our findings are robust to alternative specifications. Overall, we highlight the political economy channel of human capital misallocation from the perspective of career concerns of local politicians.

中文翻译：

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政治宣传与劳动力投资效率

本研究通过关注人力资本配置不当，研究了政治晋升激励措施对企业劳动力投资效率的影响。我们发现1）地方政客的晋升激励措施显着提高了公司一级的就业增长并降低了劳动投资效率。2）因果关系是使用当地采矿事故中的死亡人数确定的，以隔离对当地政客晋升激励的外来冲击，而安慰剂测试进一步证实了因果关系。3）对于雇用不足的公司，晋升激励措施只会增加对低人力资本的使用，从而扭曲了人力资本结构并降低了劳动投资效率。4）我们的发现对替代规范具有鲁棒性。总体，