Within a model of variable supply of capital due to international mobility and variable labor supply due to endogenous labor-leisure choice, we revisit the issues of vertical fiscal externalities, and of federal tax-transfers. Capital and labor taxes by federal and state governments finance the provision of federal and of state public consumption goods. When capital and labor are substitutes in production, we show that (i) the state’s optimal policy calls for capital and labor taxes, (ii) the vertical fiscal externality can be reversed from negative, implying inefficiently high noncooperative capital taxes, to positive, implying inefficiently low noncooperative capital taxes, and (iii) under centralized leadership the federal government replicates the second best optimum with a capital tax, and possibly, top-down transfers.

中文翻译：

---

可变要素供给下的垂直财政外部性和联邦税收转移

在一个因国际流动而导致的可变资本供给和由于内生的劳动力休闲选择而导致的可变劳动力供给的模型中，我们重新审视了纵向财政外部性和联邦税收转移的问题。联邦和州政府的资本税和劳工税为联邦和州公共消费品的提供提供资金。当资本和劳动力替代生产时，我们表明（i）国家的最优政策要求征收资本税和劳动力税，（ii）垂直的财政外部性可以从负的，意味着效率低下的非合作资本税反转为正的，这意味着效率低下的非合作资本税；（iii）在中央领导下，联邦政府采用资本税和自上而下的转移支付来复制第二好的最佳选择。