This study focuses on micro-level phenomena and time issues that have been traditionally neglected in both corporate governance and corporate social responsibility research. Drawing on agency theory concerning time-based managerial incentives (i.e. short term and long term), we investigate which managerial incentives for compensation drive the sensitivity of corporate social performance (CSP) to corporate financial performance (CFP). Using data for publicly listed Korean firms, we found a significant and positive relationship between CSP and CFP, with this relationship strengthened in firms with high managerial ownership but insignificant in those with high earnings-based compensation. Furthermore, we found that the interaction effects of CSP and high earnings-based compensation on CFP become positive in firms with high managerial ownership, indicating that the sensitivity between CSP and CFP is driven by long-term managerial incentives.

JEL Classification: M12, M14, G35

这项研究的重点是在公司治理和公司社会责任研究中传统上被忽略的微观现象和时间问题。基于关于基于时间的管理激励（即短期和长期）的代理理论，我们研究了哪些薪酬补偿管理激励驱动了公司社会绩效（CSP）对公司财务绩效（CFP）的敏感性。使用韩国上市公司的数据，我们发现CSP和CFP之间存在着显着的正相关关系，这种关系在具有高管理所有权的公司中得到了加强，而在具有高收入薪酬的公司中则微不足道。此外，我们发现在具有较高管理层所有权的公司中，CSP和高收益薪酬对CFP的交互作用变得正，这表明CSP和CFP之间的敏感性是由长期的管理激励驱动的。

JEL分类：M12，M14，G35