ABSTRACT

This study examines the effects of National Pension Service (NPS) of Korea and the Stewardship Code on dividend policy and firm value. We find that NPS increases the dividend yield of firms, and the effects are more pronounced after the implementation of the code. Furthermore, the code forces firms to pay involuntarily high dividends compared to industry rivals. Firm value is negatively associated with the ownership of NPS which is exacerbated after the code. Results highlight the agency problem in public pension funds that the government pursues its own interests rather than those of the beneficiaries.

中文翻译：

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公共养老金和管理守则对股息和公司价值的影响：韩国国家养老金局的证据

摘要

本研究考察了韩国国民养老金局（NPS）和《管理守则》对股利政策和公司价值的影响。我们发现，NPS可以提高公司的股息收益率，并且在实施该守则后其影响更为明显。此外，与行业竞争对手相比，该法规迫使企业自愿支付高额股息。企业价值与NPS的所有权负相关，而NPS的所有权在代码后会加剧。结果突出显示了公共养老基金的代理问题，即政府追求自身利益而不是受益者利益。