“Meta-argument allegations” consist of protestations that an interlocutor’s speech is wrongfully offensive or will trigger undesirable social consequences. Such protestations are meta-argument in the sense that they do not interrogate the soundness of an opponent’s argumentation, but instead focus on external features of that argument. They are allegations because they imply moral wrongdoing. There is a legitimate place for meta-argument allegations, and the moral and epistemic goods that can come from them will be front of mind for those levelling such allegations. But I argue there is a dark side to such allegations, and their epistemic and moral costs must be seriously weighed. Meta-argument allegations have a concerning capacity to derail discussions about important topics, stymieing argumentational interactions and the goods they provide. Such allegations can license efforts to silence, punish and deter—even as they provoke the original speaker to retaliate in kind. Used liberally, such allegations can escalate conflicts, block open-mindedness, and discourage constructive dialogues. In response, I defend “argumentational tolerance”—a principled wariness in employing meta-argument allegations—as a virtue of ethical argument.

“元论点指控”包括对对话者的言论不当冒犯或会引发不良社会后果的抗议。这种抗议是元论证，因为它们不质疑对手论证的合理性，而是关注该论证的外部特征。他们是指控因为它们暗示着道德上的不法行为。元论点指控有一个合法的位置，可以来自它们的道德和认知善将成为提出此类指控的人的首要考虑。但我认为这些指控有阴暗面，必须认真权衡它们的认知和道德成本。元论点指控有一种令人担忧的能力，可以破坏有关重要主题的讨论，阻碍争论性互动及其提供的商品。此类指控可以允许采取沉默、惩罚和威慑的努力——即使它们会激怒最初的发言人进行实物报复。随意使用此类指控会升级冲突，阻碍开放的态度，并阻碍建设性对话。作为回应，