This paper distinguishes between two types of persuasive force arguments can have in terms of two different connections between arguments and inferences. First, borrowing from Pinto (in Argument, inference, and dialectic, Kluwer Academic Pub, Dordrecht, 2001), an arguer's invitation to inference directly persuades an addressee if the addressee performs an inference that the arguer invites. This raises the question of how invited inferences are determined by an invitation to inference. Second, borrowing from Sorenson (J Philos 88:245–266, 1991), an arguer's invitation to inference indirectly persuades an addressee if the addressee performs an inference guided by the argument even though it is uninvited. This raises the question of how an invitation to inference can guide inferences that the arguer does not use the argument to invite. Focusing on belief-inducing inference, the primary aims here are (i) to clarify what is necessary for an addressee's belief-inducing inference to be invited by an argument used as an instrument of persuasion; and (ii) to highlight the capacity of arguments to guide such inferences. The paper moves beyond Pinto's (2001) discussion by using Boghossian's (Philos Stud 169:1–18, 2014) Taking Condition in service of (i) and (ii) in way that illustrates how epistemically bad arguments can rationally persuade addressees of their conclusions.

中文翻译：

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论证、推理和说服

本文根据论点和推论之间的两种不同联系区分了两种类型的说服力论据。首先，借用 Pinto（在 Argument, inference, and dialectic, Kluwer Academic Pub, Dordrecht, 2001）中，如果受话人执行了受话人邀请的推理，则受话人的推理邀请会直接说服受话人。这就提出了一个问题，即受邀推论是如何由推论邀请决定的。其次，从 Sorenson (J Philos 88:245–266, 1991) 中借用，如果受话者在论证的指导下进行推理，即使它是不请自来的，则论证者的推理邀请间接说服了受话者。这就提出了一个问题，即推论的邀请如何指导论证者不使用该论证来邀请的推论。专注于信念诱导推理，这里的主要目的是 (i) 澄清作为说服工具的论点邀请收件人的信念诱导推理的必要条件；(ii) 强调论证指导此类推论的能力。该论文通过使用 Boghossian (Philos Stud 169:1–18, 2014) 以条件服务于 (i) 和 (ii) 的方式超越了 Pinto (2001) 的讨论，说明了认知上的错误论证如何合理地说服收件人接受他们的结论.