Recent disputes (Mizrahi in Inform Logic 33(1):57–79, 2013; Mizrahi in Inform Logic 36(2):238–252, 2016; Mizrahi in Argumentation 32(2):175–195, 2018; Seidel in Inform Logic 34(2):192–218, 2014; Seidel in Inform Logic 36(2):253–264, 2016; Hinton in Inform Logic 35(4):539–554, 2015) on the strength of arguments from expert opinion (AEO) give rise to a potential legitimacy crisis of it. Mizrahi (Inform Logic 33(1):57–79, 2013; Inform Logic 36(2):238–252; Argumentation 32(2):175–195, 2018) claims that AEO are weak arguments by presenting two independent arguments. The first argument (i.e., the argument of unreliable experts) is that AEO are weak arguments because empirical studies show that expert opinions p do not make p significantly more likely to be true. The second argument (i.e., the argument of biased experts) is that AEO are weak arguments because empirical studies show that expert opinions are susceptible to the kinds of cognitive biases that novice opinions are susceptible to. In this paper, I intend to argue that Mizrahi’s two arguments both fail because of inconsistency, irrelevance, and insufficiency. Nevertheless, Mizrahi’s arguments help to evaluate AEO better by expanding the relevant critical questions.

中文翻译：

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专家观点论证的合法性危机：我们不能相信专家吗？

最近的争议（Mizrahi in Inform Logic 33(1):57-79, 2013; Mizrahi in Inform Logic 36(2):238-252, 2016; Mizrahi in Argumentation 32(2):175-195, 2018; Seidel in Inform Logic 34(2):192–218, 2014；Seidel in Inform Logic 36(2):253–264, 2016；Hinton in Inform Logic 35(4):539–554, 2015）根据专家意见的论据(AEO) 引发潜在的合法性危机。Mizrahi（Inform Logic 33(1):57-79, 2013; Inform Logic 36(2):238-252; Argumentation 32(2):175-195, 2018）通过提出两个独立的论点声称 AEO 是弱论点。第一个论点（即不可靠专家的论点）是 AEO 是弱论点，因为经验研究表明专家意见 p 并没有使 p 更可能为真。第二个参数（即 有偏见的专家的论点）是 AEO 是弱论点，因为经验研究表明专家意见容易受到新手意见容易受到的认知偏见的影响。在本文中，我打算论证 Mizrahi 的两个论点都因不一致、不相关和不足而失败。尽管如此，Mizrahi 的论点通过扩展相关的关键问题有助于更好地评估 AEO。