With irreversible investments in safety, changes in workers’ compensation laws should affect employer incentives asymmetrically: increases in workers’ compensation generosity should cause employers to invest more in safety, but comparable decreases might not cause them to disinvest in existing precautionary programs or equipment. Although maximum weekly benefits caps have been fairly stable, state laws have expanded or restricted workers’ compensation on multiple other dimensions. State laws may impose new requirements regarding burdens of proof, access to medical care, and the duration of benefits. This article estimates the effect of changes in these more comprehensive measures of workers’ compensation laws on workplace safety. Using confidential, restricted data from the Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries, the article finds that increases in workers’ compensation generosity lead to a significant decrease in fatality rates, while decreases in workers’ compensation generosity do not significantly increase fatality rates.

中文翻译：

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劳动者赔偿法变化对死亡率的不对称影响

在安全方面不可逆转地进行投资时，工人赔偿法律的变化应不对称地影响雇主的激励措施：工人赔偿慷慨性的提高应导致雇主在安全方面进行更多的投资，但是可比的下降可能不会导致他们对现有的预防计划或设备进行投资。尽管每周最高福利上限一直相当稳定，但州法律已在其他多个方面扩大或限制了工人的薪酬。州法律可能对证明负担，获得医疗服务以及福利期限施加新要求。本文估计了这些更全面的工人补偿法措施对工作场所安全的影响。使用致命职业伤害普查中的机密，受限数据，