This article offers an analysis of negligence law in an environment with asymmetric information and costly signaling. We consider three possible variations of the negligence doctrine, based on its two elements—the standard of care and damages. We find that accounting for signaling costs affects the social desirability of the negligence rule. In a nontrivial number of cases, the social costs are lowest under the variation of the negligence regime in which the standard of care is the same for all types of victims but damages vary according to the victim’s type. This analysis provides an efficiency-based justification for the use of negligence doctrine in bodily injuries and wrongful death cases, a practice that has been considered one of the greatest “misalignment puzzles” in negligence law.

中文翻译：

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信息过失法

本文提供了在信息不对称且信令昂贵的环境中对过失规律的分析。我们基于疏忽学说的两个要素-照料和赔偿标准，考虑了三种可能的变体。我们发现，计算信号成本会影响过失规则的社会可取性。在少数情况下，根据疏忽制度的变化，社会成本最低，在这种疏忽制度下，所有类型的受害者的护理标准均相同，但赔偿金根据受害者的类型而有所不同。该分析为在身体伤害和不法死亡案件中使用过失学说提供了基于效率的理由，这种做法被认为是过失法中最大的“错位之谜”之一。