A well-known result in economic analysis of contract law is that expectation damages lead to over-reliance by the non-breaching party. Recently, the contractual disgorgement remedy has attracted much attention from scholars, yet no attempt has been made to analyze reliance investment under this remedy. In this article, we develop a model showing that under disgorgement a problem arises that is the mirror image of the problem that arises under expectation damages. While expectation damages lead to over-reliance by the non-breaching party, the disgorgement remedy leadsto over-reliance by the breaching party. Therefore, the choice between these two contractual remedies shoulddepend on which over-reliance problem is more costly. We also highlight other factors that can guide the choice between these two remedies.

中文翻译：

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合同解除后的过度依赖

合同法经济学分析的一个众所周知的结果是，预期损害导致非违约方过度依赖。近年来，合同剥夺救济法引起了学者的广泛关注，但尚未尝试分析这种救济法下的依赖投资。在本文中，我们开发了一个模型，该模型显示了在杂乱无章的情况下出现的问题，该问题是预期损害下出现的问题的镜像。预期损害会导致非违约方过分依赖，而非法所得补救措施则会导致违约方过分依赖。因此，在这两种合同救济之间进行选择应取决于哪个过度依赖问题的成本更高。我们还将重点介绍可以指导这两种补救措施之间进行选择的其他因素。