Growing evidence suggests that many people are surprisingly responsive to unconventional policy tools, such as defaults or choice-framing, yet unresponsive to conventional ones, such as taxes or subsidies. This article studies the optimal choice of policy instrument in settings characterized by such features. We utilize a simple binary-choice model in which decision-makers are either active or passive; active choosers make their decisions by comparing perceived costs and benefits whereas passive choosers select whichever option is the default. From this simple model, a number of results emerge. First, manipulating the default option is preferable to imposing a mandate when active choosers tend to make correct decisions. Second, taxes and defaults are complements, not substitutes; employing the two types of instruments in conjunction can yield better results than utilizing either one alone. Finally, the optimal combination of taxes and defaults is typically preferable to a mandate even in settings where active choosers are prone to biases. The results establish important limits on the range of settings in which mandates are an efficient policy response to decision-maker errors.

中文翻译：

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违约，授权和税收：主动和被动决策者的政策设计

越来越多的证据表明，许多人对非常规的政策工具（例如违约或选择框架）做出了令人惊讶的反应，而对税收或补贴等常规手段却无反应。本文研究了以此类功能为特征的环境中策略工具的最佳选择。我们使用一个简单的二元选择模型，决策者可以是主动的也可以是被动的。主动选择者通过比较预期的成本和收益来做出决策，而被动选择者则选择默认的选项。从这个简单的模型中，可以得出许多结果。首先，当主动选择者倾向于做出正确的决定时，操纵默认选项比强加授权更为可取。第二，税收和违约是补充而非替代。结合使用两种类型的仪器可以比单独使用任何一种仪器产生更好的结果。最后，即使在主动选择者容易产生偏见的环境中，税收和违约的最优组合通常也比强制性更可取。结果对设置范围建立了重要的限制，在这些设置中，授权是对决策者错误的有效策略响应。