The regulation of controlling shareholder related‐party transactions is one of corporate law's animating concerns. A recent Chancery Court decision extends the double approval framework endorsed by the Delaware Supreme Court—independent director committees and a majority of the minority shareholders—to non‐freezeout transactions. This article explains why the Chancery Court's innovation does not decrease the risk faced by minority shareholders. Subjecting a transaction to the double approval framework is a voluntary decision. Transaction planners will willingly traverse this path if the benefits outweigh the loss in deal certainty and attendant costs. When almost every freezeout is challenged in court, the voluntary application of this framework is the logical outcome. The calculus in the non‐freezeout context leads to a different result. Non‐freezeouts must be challenged by a derivative lawsuit. The procedural hurdles inherent in the derivative mechanism affect both the demand for the ratification framework and the incentive to comply. Without a tangible threat of a lawsuit to coax voluntary compliance in the non‐freezeout setting, transaction planners have nothing to gain by subjecting the deal to the double approval gauntlet. This article's analysis reveals a large gap in the enforcement of self‐dealing transactions. Recent high‐profile litigation exposes questionable adherence to the double approval framework for obviously conflicted non‐freezeout transactions. The paucity of derivative lawsuits foretells a troubling fate for similar transactions at less enticing litigation targets. Worse yet, the superficial step toward improved minority shareholder protection stifles the discussion on additional reform.

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控股股东执法差距

控股股东关联交易的监管是公司法最令人关注的问题之一。Chancery法院最近的一项裁决将特拉华州最高法院（独立董事委员会和多数少数股东）认可的双重批准框架扩展至非冻结交易。本文解释了为什么Chancery法院的创新不能降低少数股东所面临的风险。使交易经受双重批准框架是自愿决定。如果收益大于交易确定性和随之而来的成本上的损失，交易计划者将乐意走这条路。当几乎所有的冻结都在法庭上受到质疑时，此框架的自愿适用都是合乎逻辑的结果。在非冻结环境中进行演算会得出不同的结果。非冻结行为必须受到派生诉讼的挑战。衍生机制固有的程序障碍既影响了对批准框架的需求，也影响了遵守动机。在非冻结环境中，如果没有明显的诱使诉讼自愿达成合规的诉讼，则交易计划制定者就无法通过使交易受双重批准权而获得任何好处。本文的分析揭示了在执行自交易中存在很大的差距。最近的备受关注的诉讼暴露了针对明显冲突的非冻结交易的双重批准框架的可疑性。衍生品诉讼的匮乏预示着类似交易的诱人命运，而这些交易却没有那么诱人的诉讼目标。更糟糕的是