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Two-Stage Game Design of Payoff Decision-Making Scheme for Crowdsourcing Dilemmas
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking ( IF 3.7 ) Pub Date : 2020-08-31 , DOI: 10.1109/tnet.2020.3018448
Hui Xia , Rui Zhang , Xiangguo Cheng , Tie Qiu , Dapeng Oliver Wu

Crowdsourcing uses collective intelligence to finish complicated tasks and is widely applied in many fields. However, the crowdsourcing dilemmas between the task requester and the task completer restrict the efficiency of system severely, e.g., the cooperation dilemma leads to the failure in the interactions and the quality of service dilemma results in the inability of task completer to provide high-quality service. Current research usually focuses on solving only one aforementioned dilemma and fails to integrate perfectly with the service architectural pattern of crowdsourcing systems. In this article, combined with the crowdsourcing interaction phase, we limit the objects that cause dilemma and propose a $\boldsymbol {t}$ wo-stage $\boldsymbol {g}$ ame $\boldsymbol {p}$ ayoff $\boldsymbol {d}$ ecision-making scheme ( TGPD ) to overcome these shortcomings. To solve the cooperation dilemma between the requester and the crowdsourcing platform, we first propose a dynamic payment method based on the reputation-quality rules for the task requester, and then develop a cos-evaluation algorithm to estimate platform’s cost, last design a co-determine algorithm to determine whether the platform adopts a cooperative strategy. To address the quality of service dilemma between the crowdsourcing platform and the workers, we first present an auction-screening method to estimate the reasonable recruitment range of workers which can be optimized by the result of cos-evaluation algorithm, and then use a reward distribution method to motivate workers to complete tasks with high quality and on time. The experimental results indicate that our new scheme successfully increases the worker’s and platforms’ payoffs at the same time, improves the accuracy of screening workers, enhances the worker’s quality of service, and decreases the platform’s cost.

中文翻译:

众包困境支付决策的两阶段博弈设计

众包使用集体智慧来完成复杂的任务,并广泛应用于许多领域。但是,任务请求者和任务完成者之间的众包困境严重限制了系统的效率,例如,合作困境导致交互失败,服务质量困境导致任务完成者无法提供高质量的服务。服务。当前的研究通常只专注于解决上述一个难题,而未能与众包系统的服务架构模式完美融合。在本文中,结合众包互动阶段,我们限制了造成困境的对象,并提出了一个解决方案。 $ \ boldsymbol {t} $ 舞台 $ \ boldsymbol {g} $ 阿美 $ \ boldsymbol {p} $ 阿约夫 $ \ boldsymbol {d} $ 决策方案( TGPD )以克服这些缺点。为了解决请求者与众包平台之间的合作难题,我们首先提出一种基于信誉质量规则的任务请求者动态支付方法,然后开发一种cos评估算法来估算平台成本,最后设计一个co-e确定算法,确定平台是否采用协作策略。为了解决众包平台和工人之间的服务质量困境,我们首先提出一种拍卖筛选方法,以估计可以通过cos评估算法优化的合理的工人招募范围,然后使用奖励分配激励工人高质量,准时完成任务的方法。
更新日期:2020-08-31
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