ABSTRACT

In two papers, Ned Block has argued that representationalists have trouble with the empirical discovery that differences in the degree of visual attention to an object can lead to a difference in how the object looks. I here respond on behalf of the representationalist. Against the argument of Block, I give a “companions-in-guilt” argument that the dilemma Block claims to find for the representationalist will, in fact, arise for anyone who accepts that attention can alter appearance in the described manner. I conclude that the facts about attention’s effects on appearance give no specific reason to reject representationalism alone. Meanwhile, I argue that Block fails to adequately motivate a key claim, the ‘phenomenal precision principle’ upon which he relies. I conclude that the representationalist has nothing to fear from.

摘要

内德·布洛克（Ned Block）在两篇论文中指出，代表性主义者对经验发现感到麻烦，因为经验发现，对对象的视觉关注程度的差异会导致对象外观的差异。我在这里代表代表作回应。针对Block的论点，我给出一个“有罪同伴”的论点，Block声称要为代表主义者寻找困境，实际上，这将对任何接受注意可以按照所述方式改变外观的人产生。我得出结论，关于注意力对外观的影响的事实并没有给出仅拒绝代表主义的具体理由。同时，我认为，布洛克未能充分激发关键主张，即他所依赖的“现象精确性原则”。我得出的结论是，代表主义者没有什么好害怕的。