Research in the last 15 years has challenged the idea that false belief attribution develops at 4 years of age. Studies with indirect false belief tasks contend to provide evidence of false belief attribution in the second year of life. We review the literature on indirect false belief tasks carried out in infants using looking and active helping paradigms. Although the results are heterogeneous and not conclusive, such tasks appear to capture a real effect. However, it is misleading to call them “false belief” tasks, as it is possible to pass them without making any false belief attribution. Infants need to keep track of the object's and agent's positions, trajectories, and focus of attention, given an intentional understanding of the agent, to pass these new tasks. We, therefore, argue that the evidence can be better explained in terms of second‐person attributions, which are transparent, extensional, nonpropositional, reciprocally contingent, and implicit. Second‐person attributions can also account for primates' mentalizing abilities, as revealed by similar indirect tasks.

中文翻译：

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婴儿在间接错误信念任务中的表现：第二人称解释

过去 15 年的研究挑战了错误信念归因在 4 岁时发展的观点。间接错误信念任务的研究力争在生命的第二年提供错误信念归因的证据。我们回顾了使用寻找和积极帮助范式在婴儿中进行的间接错误信念任务的文献。尽管结果是异质的并且不是决定性的，但这些任务似乎捕捉到了真正的效果。但是，将它们称为“错误信念”任务是一种误导，因为可以在不进行任何错误信念归因的情况下通过它们。婴儿需要跟踪对象和代理的位置、轨迹和注意力焦点，给定对代理的有意了解，以完成这些新任务。因此，我们，认为证据可以用第二人称归因来更好地解释，第二人称归因是透明的、外延的、非命题的、互惠偶然的和隐含的。第二人称归因也可以解释灵长类动物的心智化能力，正如类似的间接任务所揭示的那样。