Energy storage technologies are key to improving grid flexibility in the presence of increasing amounts of intermittent renewable generation. We propose an insurance contract that suitably compensates energy storage systems for providing flexibility. Such a contract provides a wider range of market opportunities for these systems while also incentivizing higher renewable penetration in the grid. We consider a day-ahead market in which generators, including renewables and storage owners, bid to be scheduled for the next operating day. Due to production uncertainty, renewable generators may be unable to meet their day-ahead production schedule, and thus be subject to a penalty. As a hedge against these penalties, we propose an insurance contract between a renewable producer and a storage owner, in which the storage reserves some energy to be used in case of renewable shortfalls. We show that such a contract incentivizes the renewable player to bid higher, thus increasing renewable participation in the electricity mix. It also provides an extra source of revenue for storage owners that may not be profitable with a purely arbitrage-based strategy in the day-ahead market. We validate our analysis through two case studies.

中文翻译：

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保险合同设计，以促进电力市场中的存储参与

在不断增加的间歇性可再生发电量的情况下，储能技术是提高电网灵活性的关键。我们提出了一份保险合同，该合同适当地补偿了储能系统以提供灵活性。此类合同为这些系统提供了更广泛的市场机会，同时也激励了电网中更高的可再生能源渗透率。我们考虑一个日间市场，在这个市场中，包括可再生能源和存储所有者在内的发电机竞标将在下一个营业日进行。由于生产的不确定性，可再生发电机可能无法满足其日间生产计划，因此将受到罚款。为了对付这些罚款，我们建议可再生生产商与存储所有者之间订立保险合同，在这种情况下，存储可保留一些能量，以防可再生资源短缺。我们表明，这种合同激励可再生能源参与者提高出价，从而增加可再生能源对电力结构的参与。它还为存储所有者提供了额外的收入来源，而在日前市场上使用纯粹基于套利的策略可能无法获利。我们通过两个案例研究来验证我们的分析。