The paper studies product bundling in a duopoly supply chain network under the influence of different power-balance structures, bundling decisions and advertising efforts on total supply chain profit. Mathematical models comprising two manufacturers and a single retailer are developed to capture the impact of bundling policy and advertisement strategy under three power-balance structures, namely Manufacturer Stackelberg, Retailer Stackelberg and Vertical Nash. Following game theory models and numerical examples, the study found that the total profit of the supply chain is undifferentiated under the manufacturer Stackelberg and Vertical Nash case in the manufacturer bundling and retailer bundling strategies. However, total supply chain profit under manufacturer bundling strongly dominates under retailer bundling in Retailer Stackelberg and Vertical Nash, and remains valid under multiple settings of market size, price elasticity and advertising elasticity. It is also found that manufacturer bundling is significantly affected by advertising effort compared to retailer bundling. The study contributes to the literature interfacing supply chain and marketing by studying bundling policy and advertising strategy simultaneously for homogenous products, under various power-balance structures and price competition.

中文翻译：

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双头垄断供应链的产品捆绑和广告策略：权力平衡视角

本文研究了在不同权力平衡结构、捆绑决策和广告努力对供应链总利润的影响下双寡头供应链网络中的产品捆绑。开发了由两个制造商和一个零售商组成的数学模型，以捕捉三种权力平衡结构下捆绑政策和广告策略的影响，即制造商 Stackelberg、零售商 Stackelberg 和 Vertical Nash。根据博弈论模型和数值例子，研究发现在制造商Stackelberg和Vertical Nash案例下，制造商捆绑和零售商捆绑策略中供应链的总利润是无差异的。然而，在零售商 Stackelberg 和 Vertical Nash 中，制造商捆绑下的供应链总利润在零售商捆绑下占主导地位，并且在市场规模、价格弹性和广告弹性的多种设置下仍然有效。还发现与零售商捆绑相比，制造商捆绑受广告努力的显着影响。该研究通过同时研究同质产品在各种权力平衡结构和价格竞争下的捆绑政策和广告策略，为连接供应链和营销的文献做出了贡献。