当前位置: X-MOL 学术Int. J. Disaster Risk Reduct. › 论文详情
Our official English website, www.x-mol.net, welcomes your feedback! (Note: you will need to create a separate account there.)
Evolutionary game analysis of decision-making dynamics of local governments and residents during wildfires
International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction ( IF 5 ) Pub Date : 2020-12-08 , DOI: 10.1016/j.ijdrr.2020.101991
Wenqiang Shi , Haizhong Wang , Chen Chen , Zhaojun Kong

The existing literature is short of exploring the interactions of stakeholders' decisions during wildfires from a dynamic perspective. Evolutionary game theory proposed based on Darwin's theory of evolution can capture the dynamic process and provide a method to analyze the complexity. This study utilizes a tripartite evolutionary game model to analyze the dynamic evolutionary process of evacuation decision-making for different decision makers in a wildfire event. The decision makers include (1) local governments who are responsible for warning, communicating with, and/or placing evacuation order, (2) residents who decide to evacuate, and (3) residents who chose to stay. Through this dynamic analysis, this study identifies evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) of different stakeholders and the whole system. A numerical example based on system dynamics (SD) is given to validate the stability of equilibrium points and analyze the influence of relative factors. The results show that (1) there are four ESS in the system among all the equilibrium points; (2) the local government would be quicker in reaching the ESS points in all scenarios; (3) local government's decision is influenced by reward and support from the higher level of government, regulation cost, and residents' behavior; whereas (4) the residents' behavior can be affected by the expected evacuation cost, loss of health and property, expected loss from looting, etc. The insights of this study could deepen understandings of the relationship between decision makers in emergency and provide guidance for effective wildfire disaster management strategies.



中文翻译:

野火期间地方政府和居民决策动态的进化博弈分析

现有文献不足以动态角度探讨野火期间利益相关者决策的相互作用。基于达尔文进化论提出的进化博弈论可以捕捉动态过程,并提供一种分析复杂性的方法。本研究利用三方进化博弈模型来分析野火事件中不同决策者的疏散决策的动态演化过程。决策者包括(1)负责警告,与疏散命令进行沟通和/或下达疏散命令的地方政府;(2)决定撤离的居民;以及(3)选择留下的居民。通过这种动态分析,本研究确定了不同利益相关者和整个系统的进化稳定策略(ESS)。给出了基于系统动力学(SD)的数值示例,以验证平衡点的稳定性并分析相关因素的影响。结果表明:(1)系统中所有平衡点之间共有四个ESS;(2)在所有情况下,地方政府都将更快地达到ESS点;(3)地方政府的决策受到上级政府的奖励和支持,规制成本和居民行为的影响;(4)居民的行为可能受到预期疏散费用,健康和财产损失,抢劫造成的预期损失等的影响。本研究的见识可以加深对紧急情况下决策者之间关系的理解,并为应急人员提供指导。有效的野火灾难管理策略。

更新日期:2020-12-26
down
wechat
bug