Researchers in academia typically perform different tasks: research, teaching and services to the scientific community. We analyze the opportunity costs in terms of a potentially reduced publication productivity associated with becoming a dean in the German institutional setting where deans are non-professional expert-leaders who temporarily take the dean position. Theoretically, we distinguish between two different effects that relate deanship and publication productivity: a  resource effect where publication productivity during and—as a result of potentially having developed a taste for service—also post deanship decrease as a result of a reduction of the available time for research and a  self-selection effect where pre-deanship publication productivity is lower than that of peers who are not about to become dean. Based on a dataset of 1110 business and economics researchers from German-speaking universities, we find evidence for a resource effect with leadership in academia reducing research productivity during and also post deanship. We find no evidence of a negative self-selection effect in the sense of less successful researchers being more likely to take the position of a dean. Reduced research productivity during and post deanship as compared to those researchers that never became dean is driven by those researchers who become dean in later periods of their career, i. e., presumably by those who deliberately shift their focus away from research and towards a stronger engagement in the scientific community in their late career years. Early career deans, on the contrary, seem to see their deanship more as a transitory role and are able to compensate the reduced resources during deanship, and they also do not suffer from a reduced publication productivity post deanship.

中文翻译：

---

成为院长的机会成本：学术界的领导者是否挤出研究？

学术界的研究人员通常执行不同的任务：研究，教学和对科学界的服务。我们根据机会成本降低潜在的出版效率来分析机会成本，因为在德国机构环境中，院长是临时担任院长职位的非专业专家领导，因此可能会成为院长。从理论上讲，我们区分了与教务管理和出版生产率有关的两种不同的影响：  资源效应 ，在此期间以及由于潜在地形成了对服务的品味，出版生产率也由于可用时间的减少而下降了。用于研究和  自我选择的效果 执教前出版物的生产率低于不愿担任院长的同行。基于来自德语大学的1110名商业和经济学研究人员的数据集，我们发现证据表明学术界的领导层会在资源节约期间和后期任职期间降低研究生产率，从而产生资源效应。我们没有发现不利的自我选择效应的证据，这意味着不太成功的研究人员更有可能担任院长一职。与那些从未担任过院长的研究人员相比，在担任院长期间和担任院长之后，研究生产率的下降是由那些在其职业生涯后期即成为院长的研究人员推动的。例如，大概是那些在职业生涯后期故意将重点从研究转移到更广泛地参与科学界的人。