We show that the Bayesian equilibrium correspondence of a Tullock contest with incomplete information is upper semicontinuous. Further, we show that when equilibrium is unique and players’ costs of effort are either state independent or uniformly bounded, then it is also lower semicontinuous, and it is robust to small perturbations of the players’ information, value for the prize, and cost of effort, as well as of the contest success function.

中文翻译：

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Tullock竞赛中贝叶斯均衡的连续性和鲁棒性

我们表明，具有不完整信息的Tullock竞赛的贝叶斯均衡对应关系是上半连续的。此外，我们表明，当均衡是唯一的并且玩家的工作成本是独立于状态或均匀受限制的时，则它也处于较低的半连续状态，并且对于玩家信息，奖品价值和成本的小扰动具有鲁棒性。的努力，以及比赛的成功功能。