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Deadlines in the market for lemons
Economic Theory Bulletin Pub Date : 2020-06-19 , DOI: 10.1007/s40505-020-00185-6
Heng Liu

This paper studies finite-horizon bargaining games with interdependent values. A long-lived seller privately learns the quality of an indivisible good. Short-lived buyers make publicly observable offers to the seller successively until the good is sold. In the two-type case, the prices are always low and only the low-quality good is gradually traded in the unique equilibrium. With a continuum of types and linear values, we characterize asymptotic equilibrium outcomes as the time horizon increases to infinity. While the finite-horizon equilibrium dynamics can be different in these two cases, as the time horizon goes to infinity, the equilibrium outcomes in both settings converge to the bargaining impasse identified by Hörner and Vieille (Econometrica 77: 29–69, 2009) in the infinite-horizon game.

中文翻译:

柠檬市场的截止日期

本文研究了具有相互依赖值的有限水平的讨价还价博弈。一个长寿的卖家私下学习一种不可分割商品的质量。live花一现的买主先后向卖主公开提供可观察到的要约,直到商品被出售为止。在两种情况下,价格总是很低,只有劣质商品才能在独特的均衡中逐渐进行交易。通过类型和线性值的连续体,我们将随着时间范围增加到无穷大来表征渐近平衡结果。尽管这两种情况下的有限水平平衡动力学可能会有所不同,但随着时间跨度达到无穷大,这两种情况下的平衡结果都收敛到了Hörner和Vieille(Econometrica 77:29–69,2009)确定的讨价还价僵局。无限地平线游戏。
更新日期:2020-06-19
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