This paper studies the effects of altruism and spitefulness in a two-sided market in which agents behave strategically and trade according to the Shapley-Shubik mechanism. By assuming that altruistic agents have concerns for others on the opposite side of the market, it shows that agents always find advantageous to trade. However, they prefer to stay out of the market and consume their endowments when there are altruistic agents who have concerns for the welfare of those on the same side of the market, or when there are spiteful agents. These non-trade situations occur either because the necessary first-order conditions for optimality are violated or because agents' payoff functions are not concave.

中文翻译：

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关于利他和恶意代理人的双边寡头贸易

本文研究了利他行为和恶意行为在双向市场中的影响，在双向市场中，代理人根据Shapley-Shubik机制进行战略性行为并进行交易。通过假设利他代理对市场另一端的其他人有所顾虑，这表明代理总是发现对贸易有利。但是，当有利他主义的代理人担心与市场同侧的人的福利时，或者有恶意的代理人时，他们宁愿不参与市场活动并消耗自己的end赋。这些非贸易情况的发生是因为违反了最优性的必要一阶条件，或者是因为代理商的收益函数不是凹进的。