This paper proposes a semi-uniform payment rule for selling multiple homogeneous objects. Under the proposed auction, all bidders pay a uniform price equal to the highest losing bid, except the bidder with the highest losing bid who, under some circumstances, pays the second highest losing bid. We show that bidders in this auction face an incentive, on the margin, to increase their bids vis-a-vis their bids in a uniform-price auction. This incentive is sufficient to eliminate the zero revenue equilibrium that has been identified in the multiple-object, uniform-price auction literature.

中文翻译：

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多个对象的半均价拍卖

本文提出了一种用于销售多个同质物品的半统一支付规则。根据提议的拍卖，所有竞标者支付的统一价格等于最高竞标价格，但最高竞标者在某些情况下支付第二高的竞标价格。我们显示，这次竞标的竞标者在一定程度上面临着激励，要在统一价格竞标中相对于竞标提高其竞标价格。这种激励措施足以消除多目标，统一价格拍卖文献中确定的零收入平衡。