My aim in this paper is to propose a way to study the role of perspectives in both the production and justification of experimental knowledge claims. My starting point for this will be Anjan Chakravartty’s claim that Ronald Giere’s perspectival account of the role of instruments in the production of such claims entails relativism in the form of irreducibly incompatible truths. This led Michela Massimi to argue that perspectivism, insofar as it wants to form a realist position, is only concerned with the justification of such claims: whether they are produced reliably is, on her view, a perspective-independent fact of the matter. Following a suggestion by Giere on how scientists handle incompatible experimental results, I will then argue that Massimi’s perspectivism can be extended to also cover the production of such claims, without falling into relativism. I will elaborate this suggestion by means of Uljana Feest’s work on how scientists handle incompatible experimental results. I will argue that, if we reconceptualize perspectives as embodied and situated ways of going about in experimentation that can be made explicit through interpretation, we can obtain a fruitful understanding of the role of perspectives in both the production and justification of experimental knowledge. While this role is primarily exploratory, it can still allow for a substantial form of realism.

中文翻译：

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透视论与实验认识论

我在本文中的目的是提出一种方法来研究观点在实验知识主张的产生和证明中的作用。我的出发点将是安然·查克拉瓦蒂（Anjan Chakravartty）的主张，即罗纳德·吉尔（Ronald Giere）对工具在此类主张产生中的作用的透视性描述，以相对不可辩驳的真理形式出现了相对主义。这导致米歇拉·马西米（Michela Massimi）认为，透视主义在想形成现实主义立场的范围内，仅关注此类主张的合理性：在她看来，是否可靠地产生这些主张是该问题与观点无关的事实。吉尔（Giere）提出了科学家如何处理不相容的实验结果的建议之后，我将争辩说，马西米（Massimi）的视野主义可以扩展到也包括此类主张的产生，而不会陷入相对主义。我将通过Uljana Feest关于科学家如何处理不相容的实验结果的工作来详细阐述这一建议。我将争辩说，如果我们重新构想观点，将其视作体现在实验中的具体体现方式和定位方式，并且可以通过解释将其明确化，那么我们将获得对观点在实验知识的产生和证明中的作用的丰硕理解。尽管此角色主要是探索性的，但它仍然可以允许实质性的现实主义形式。我们可以获得对观点在实验知识的产生和证明中的作用的卓有成效的理解。尽管此角色主要是探索性的，但它仍然可以允许实质性的现实主义形式。我们可以获得对观点在实验知识的产生和证明中的作用的卓有成效的理解。尽管此角色主要是探索性的，但它仍然可以允许实质性的现实主义形式。