Hohfeld’s analysis ( Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning , 1913, 1917) on the different types of rights and duties is highly influential in analytical legal theory, and it is considered as a fundamental theory in AI&Law and normative multi-agent systems. Yet a century later, the formalization of this theory remains, in various ways, unresolved. In this paper I provide a formal analysis of how the working of a system containing Hohfeldian rights and duties can be delineated. This formalization starts from using the same tools as the classical ones by Kanger and Lindahl used, but instead of focusing on the algebraic features of rights and duties, it aims at providing a comprehensive analysis of what these rights and duties actually are and how they behave and at saying something substantial on Power too—maintaining all along the Hohfeldian intentions that these rights and duties are sui generis and inherently relational.

中文翻译：

---

理解霍菲尔德和形式化法律权利：霍菲尔德的概念及其条件后果

Hohfeld 对不同类型的权利和义务的分析（Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judial Reasoning , 1913, 1917）在分析法理论中具有很高的影响力，被认为是 AI&Law 和规范性多代理系统中的基础理论。然而，一个世纪后，这一理论的形式化在各种方面仍未得到解决。在本文中，我对如何描述包含霍菲尔德权利和义务的系统的工作进行了正式分析。这种形式化开始于使用与康格尔和林达尔使用的经典工具相同的工具，而不是关注权利和义务的代数特征，