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Metaethical Agnosticism: Practical Reasons for Acting When Agnostic About the Existence of Moral Reasons
The Journal of Value Inquiry ( IF 0.545 ) Pub Date : 2019-01-29 , DOI: 10.1007/s10790-019-09682-9
Joseph Len Miller

There has been little discussion about how to act when uncertain about the existence of moral reasons in general. In this paper I will argue that despite being uncertain about the existence of moral reasons, someone can still have a practical reason to act in a particular way (under certain conditions). This practical reason is morally relevant because it will have an impact on whether we’re making the correct moral decision (if there is a correct moral decision). This practical reason will result from a principle of decision-making that can be used when someone is agnostic about the existence of moral reasons (‘metaethical agnosticism’). The aims of this paper include explicitly beginning the discussion about this topic and advocating for a principle of moral decision-making that can be used despite being metaethically agnostic.

中文翻译:

元伦理不可知论:当对道德原因的存在不可知时采取行动的实际原因

关于在不确定一般道德理由的存在时如何行动的讨论很少。在本文中,我将论证,尽管不确定道德理由的存在,但某人仍然可以有实际理由以特定方式(在某些条件下)行事。这个实际原因在道德上是相关的,因为它会影响我们是否做出正确的道德决定(如果有正确的道德决定)。这个实际原因来自决策原则,当某人对道德原因的存在不可知(“元伦理不可知论”)时,可以使用该原则。本文的目的包括明确开始有关该主题的讨论,并倡导道德决策原则,尽管在元伦理学上不可知,但仍可使用该原则。
更新日期:2019-01-29
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