This paper presents a new reading of Kant's moral feeling: in lieu of highlighting a positive feeling of respect, I am interested in a thorough phenomenological interpretation of a negative feeling of humiliation. The paper's tone is set by underscoring that human moral Gesinnung is that which is necessarily cultivated, which entails that the striving moral agent, among other things, learns to identify and confront inclinations. It is argued, then, that one's mindfulness of the various kinds of pain of humiliated inclinations presupposes the agent's aesthetic attunement to the law of duty. To this end, two phenomenological interpretations are offered. First, general humiliation Kant caters for in the Critique of Practical Reason. Second, specific humiliation Kant alludes to in the Metaphysics of Morals. On the whole, the paper's findings ascertain the epistemic weight of humiliation, which to date has been undervalued.

中文翻译：

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康德的屈辱现象学

这篇论文提出了对康德道德情感的新解读：代替强调积极的尊重感，我感兴趣的是对消极的屈辱感进行彻底的现象学解释。这篇论文的基调是强调人类道德的 Gesinnung 是必须培养的，这需要努力的道德主体，除其他外，学会识别和对抗倾向。因此，有人争辩说，一个人对各种屈辱倾向的痛苦的正念以行动者对责任法则的审美协调为先决条件。 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 为此，提供了两种现象学解释。首先，康德在《实践理性批判》中迎合了普遍的羞辱。其次，康德在《道德形而上学》中提到的特殊屈辱。总体而言，论文'