This paper makes a phenomenological contribution to the distinction between personal and subpersonal types of explanation. I expound the little-known fact that Husserl gives an account of personal level explanation via his exposition of our capacity to express the understanding of another’s motivational nexus when we are in the personalistic attitude. I show that Husserl’s unique exposition of the motivational nexus conveys its concrete, internally coherent, and intentional nature, involving relationships amongst the sense contents of acts of consciousness. Moreover, the motivational nexus is a generative space of possibility and choice. I show that, for these reasons, motivational explanation is not causal, nor deductive nomological, nor does it (or should it) reduce to subpersonal explanation. I finish with the comment that the uniqueness of personal level explanation points towards the possibility that the human sciences (including psychology) ought also employ types of explanations not found in natural sciences.

中文翻译：

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胡塞尔个人层面的解释

本文对区分个人解释类型和次个人解释类型做出了现象学贡献。我阐述了一个鲜为人知的事实，即胡塞尔通过阐述当我们处于个人主义态度时我们表达对他人动机联系的理解的能力，从而给出了个人层面的解释。我表明胡塞尔对动机联系的独特阐述传达了其具体、内在连贯和有意的性质，涉及意识行为的感觉内容之间的关系。此外，动机联系是可能性和选择的生成空间。我表明，由于这些原因，动机解释不是因果关系，也不是演绎法，也不会（或应该）归结为次个人解释。