Husserl is known to have oriented many aspects of his extensive analyses of phantasy around a contrast to perception: what phantasy and perception have in common, for example, is their intuitiveness; yet, while in perception something is encountered ‘in the flesh,’ in phantasy this experience is modified by its ‘ as if in the flesh’ character. However, both in the majority of Husserl’s reflections on phantasy and in much of the secondary literature on the topic, we find few further details concerning the difference between both modes of intuitiveness: ‘in the flesh’ and ‘ as if in the flesh.’ In this paper, I draw on sources from Husserl’s later work in order to get clarification on at least one important point of difference, namely the ways in which individuation and identity, that is, constitutions of individual and identical objects, clearly set apart phantasy from perception. As we will see, this requires an understanding of Husserl’s account of objective time, and of the constitution of individual identical objects with their unique positions in objective time. After an introductory discussion of the meaning and the conditions of individuation in the methodical framework of phenomenology, I will lay out the different levels of the constitution of objective time (1+2). In the second part of the paper, I will try to follow and explore one of Husserl’s arguments that contrasts the constitutional performances involved in the constitution of phantasy objects with the individuation of real objects in objective time (3+4). The textual basis for this discussion is to be found in Husserl’s last book, Experience and Judgement . In what follows, I will begin with a short discussion of the concepts of individuality, individuation, uniqueness and identity, and also ask why these issues may be of special interest for a phenomenologist who is investigating the phenomenon of phantasy.

中文翻译：

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幻想的时间和个性化的局限

众所周知，胡塞尔对幻象进行了广泛的分析，其许多方面都围绕着与知觉的对比：例如，幻象和知觉的共同点是它们的直观性。然而，尽管在感知中“在肉体中”遇到了某些东西，但在幻象中，这种体验被“ 好像 在肉体中”的性格所改变。然而，无论是在胡塞尔对幻象的大多数反思中，还是在有关该主题的许多次要文献中，我们几乎都找不到关于两种直观模式之间差异的更多细节：“在肉体中”和“ 好像” 在肉体中。在本文中，我借鉴了胡塞尔后来的工作，以澄清至少一个重要的差异点，即个体和同一性的构成方式，即单个和相同物体的构成，清楚地将幻想与知觉。正如我们将看到的，这需要了解胡塞尔对客观时间的解释，以及对单个相同物体在客观时间内具有独特位置的构成的理解。在现象学的方法论框架中对个性化的含义和条件进行了介绍性讨论之后，我将阐述客观时间构成的不同层次（1 + 2）。在本文的第二部分，我将尝试并探索胡塞尔的一种论点，该论点将虚构对象的构造表现与客观时间内真实对象的个体化（3 + 4）形成对比。讨论的文字基础可以在胡塞尔的最后一本书中找到， 经验与判断 。接下来，我将简短讨论个性，个性化，唯一性和身份的概念，并询问为什么这些现象对于正在研究幻象现象的现象学家特别感兴趣。