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Game Theoretical Analysis on Acceptance of a Cloud Data Access Control System Based on Reputation
IEEE Transactions on Cloud Computing ( IF 6.5 ) Pub Date : 2020-10-01 , DOI: 10.1109/tcc.2016.2632110
Lijun Gao , Zheng Yan , Laurence T. Yang

With the rapid development of the Internet, cloud storage has penetrated into every aspect of human society. However, cloud data disclosure happens more and more frequently, which makes cloud data security and privacy protection impact wide adoption of cloud storage. Control cloud data access based on reputation by introducing a Reputation Center (RC) was proposed and demonstrated to secure cloud data effectively in [9] . But the acceptance of such a system by cloud users and Cloud Service Providers (CSPs) is crucial for its practical deployment and final success. In this paper, we investigate the acceptance of a cloud data access control system based on reputation using Game Theory. Due to the existence of dishonest CSPs, there exists a social reputation dilemma among CSPs, which seriously impedes the popularity of cloud storage. To encourage users to use cloud storage and suppress collusion between CSPs and data requesters, a repeated public-goods game is built up by applying a compensation mechanism to improve the utilities of cloud users and a punishment mechanism based on reputation to incent honest behaviors. Theoretical analysis and simulation results show the effectiveness of the compensation and punishment mechanisms to increase cloud storage rate and restrain dishonest system entities.

中文翻译:

基于信誉的云数据访问控制系统验收博弈分析

随着互联网的飞速发展,云存储已经渗透到人类社会的方方面面。然而,云数据泄露的发生越来越频繁,这使得云数据安全和隐私保护影响了云存储的广泛采用。在[9]中提出并证明了通过引入声誉中心(RC)来控制基于声誉的云数据访问以有效保护云数据。但是云用户和云服务提供商 (CSP) 对此类系统的接受对其实际部署和最终成功至关重要。在本文中,我们使用博弈论调查了基于信誉的云数据访问控制系统的接受度。由于不诚实的CSP的存在,CSP之间存在着社会声誉困境,严重阻碍了云存储的普及。为了鼓励用户使用云存储,抑制 CSP 与数据请求者之间的勾结,通过应用补偿机制来提高云用户的效用和基于声誉的惩罚机制来激励诚实行为,构建了重复的公共产品博弈。理论分析和仿真结果表明了补偿和惩罚机制在提高云存储率和抑制不诚实系统实体方面的有效性。
更新日期:2020-10-01
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