This paper studies the effect of information suppression on Naor's model as well as on Edelson and Hildebrand's model under geometric distribution. We set the suitable non-cooperative games and search for their Nash equilibria under the observable and unobservable system. In each case, we analyze the effects of information level on the customers' equilibrium and socially optimal balking strategies as well as on the profit maximization of the system manager. The socially optimal behavior and the inefficiency of the equilibrium strategies are quantified via the price of anarchy measure. We discuss a comparison study of the profit maximization and social welfare under an imposed admission fee. Also, the impact of information on the selfish and social optimal joining rates is examined. Numerical results are presented to exemplify the impact of system parameters on the optimal behavior of customers under different information levels.

中文翻译：

---

可观察和不可观察的离散时间队列中的最佳客户行为

本文研究了信息抑制对几何分布下的Naor模型以及Edelson和Hildebrand模型的影响。我们设置了合适的非合作博弈，并在可观测和不可观测系统下寻找它们的纳什均衡。在每种情况下，我们都会分析信息水平对客户均衡和社会最优拒绝策略以及对系统经理利润最大化的影响。社会最优行为和均衡策略的低效率通过无政府状态度量的价格进行量化。我们讨论了在收取入场费的情况下利润最大化和社会福利的比较研究。此外，还研究了信息对自私和社会最优加入率的影响。