SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization, Volume 58, Issue 6, Page 3559-3585, January 2020.
A monopolist platform (the principal) shares profits with a population of affiliates (the agents), heterogeneous in skill, by offering them a common nonlinear contract contingent on individual revenue. The principal cannot discriminate across individual skill but knows its distribution and aims at maximizing profits. This paper identifies the optimal contract, its implied profits, and agents' effort as the unique solution to an equation depending on skill distribution and agents' costs of effort. If skill is Pareto-distributed and agents' costs include linear and power components, then closed-form solutions highlight two regimes: If linear costs are low, the principal's share of revenues is insensitive to skill distribution and decreases as agents' costs increase. If linear costs are high, then the principal's share is insensitive to the agents' costs and increases as inequality in skill increases.

中文翻译：

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在共享经济中分享利益

SIAM控制与优化杂志，第58卷，第6期，第3559-3585页，2020年1月。
垄断者平台（委托人）通过向他们提供取决于个人收入的通用非线性合同，与技能各异的分支机构（代理商）共享利润。校长无法区分个人技能，但知道其技能分布并致力于最大程度地提高利润。本文将最佳合同，其隐含利润和代理商的努力确定为取决于技能分布和代理商的努力成本的方程式的唯一解。如果技能是帕累托分配的，而代理商的成本包括线性和动力成分，则封闭形式的解决方案将突出两个方案：如果线性成本较低，则委托人的收益份额对技能分配不敏感，并且随着代理商成本的增加而降低。如果线性成本很高，则本金