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Theoretical and experimental investigation of driver noncooperative-game steering control behavior
IEEE/CAA Journal of Automatica Sinica ( IF 11.8 ) Pub Date : 2020-11-26 , DOI: 10.1109/jas.2020.1003480
Xiaoxiang Na 1 , David Cole 1
Affiliation  

This paper investigates two noncooperative-game strategies which may be used to represent a human driverʼ s steering control behavior in response to vehicle automated steering intervention. The first strategy, namely the Nash strategy is derived based on the assumption that a Nash equilibrium is reached in a noncooperative game of vehicle path-following control involving a driver and a vehicle automated steering controller. The second one, namely the Stackelberg strategy is derived based on the assumption that a Stackelberg equilibrium is reached in a similar context. A simulation study is performed to study the differences between the two proposed noncooperative-game strategies. An experiment using a fixed-base driving simulator is carried out to measure six test driversʼ steering behavior in response to vehicle automated steering intervention. The Nash strategy is then fitted to measured driver steering wheel angles following a model identification procedure. Control weight parameters involved in the Nash strategy are identified. It is found that the proposed Nash strategy with the identified control weights is capable of representing the trend of measured driver steering behavior and vehicle lateral responses. It is also found that the proposed Nash strategy is superior to the classic driver steering control strategy which has widely been used for modeling driver steering control over the past. A discussion on improving automated steering control using the gained knowledge of driver noncooperative-game steering control behavior was made.

中文翻译:

驾驶员非合作游戏转向控制行为的理论和实验研究

本文研究了两种非合作博弈策略,这些策略可以用来代表驾驶员对车辆自动转向干预的转向控制行为。第一种策略,即纳什策略,是基于以下假设得出的:在涉及驾驶员和车辆自动转向控制器的车辆路径跟随控制的非合作游戏中达到纳什均衡。第二种方法,即Stackelberg策略是基于在类似情况下达到Stackelberg平衡的假设而得出的。进行了仿真研究,以研究两种拟议的非合作博弈策略之间的差异。进行了基于固定驾驶模拟器的实验,以测量六名测试驾驶员的响应于车辆自动转向干预的转向行为。然后按照模型识别程序将Nash策略拟合到测量的驾驶员方向盘角度。确定了纳什策略中涉及的控制权重参数。发现所提出的具有确定的控制权重的纳什策略能够代表所测量的驾驶员转向行为和车辆横向响应的趋势。还发现,提出的Nash策略优于过去已广泛用于对驾驶员转向控制进行建模的经典驾驶员转向控制策略。讨论了使用驾驶员非合作游戏转向控制行为的知识来改进自动转向控制。确定了纳什策略中涉及的控制权重参数。发现所提出的具有确定的控制权重的纳什策略能够代表所测量的驾驶员转向行为和车辆横向响应的趋势。还发现,提出的Nash策略优于过去被广泛用于对驾驶员转向控制进行建模的经典驾驶员转向控制策略。讨论了使用驾驶员非合作游戏转向控制行为的知识来改进自动转向控制。确定了纳什策略中涉及的控制权重参数。发现所提出的具有确定的控制权重的纳什策略能够代表所测量的驾驶员转向行为和车辆横向响应的趋势。还发现,提出的Nash策略优于过去已广泛用于对驾驶员转向控制进行建模的经典驾驶员转向控制策略。讨论了使用驾驶员非合作游戏转向控制行为的知识来改进自动转向控制。还发现,提出的Nash策略优于过去已广泛用于对驾驶员转向控制进行建模的经典驾驶员转向控制策略。讨论了使用驾驶员非合作游戏转向控制行为的知识来改进自动转向控制。还发现,提出的Nash策略优于过去已广泛用于对驾驶员转向控制进行建模的经典驾驶员转向控制策略。讨论了使用驾驶员非合作游戏转向控制行为的知识来改进自动转向控制。
更新日期:2020-11-27
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