Content delivery based on device-to-device (D2D) communications has been widely considered an effective response to the prevalence of content sharing and local services. In order to ensure its advantages, content requesters (CRs) should decide from which content providers (CPs) they obtain the desired content. Moreover, no CP will provide contents for free; thus, an incentive should be given to motivate the CPs. In this work, we solve the content delivery utilizing a monetary incentive. In particular, each CP just transmits a part of the content to CR to reduce the energy consumption. Simultaneously, we introduce the social tie to improve the incentive efficiency, with the popularity of mobile social networks. Specifically, considering the two-layer architecture consisting of the CR and the CPs, a Stackelberg game model is introduced to model the content delivery. The CR works as the leader, and decides the monetary incentive. The CPs work as the followers, and decide the proportion of the provided content. Then, the expression of the Stackelberg equilibrium is given, and a content delivery and pricing algorithm based on the Stackelberg game is designed to converge to the Stackelberg equilibrium through finite-time iterations. Simulation results provide evidences for its efficiency.

基于设备到设备（D2D）通信的内容交付已被广泛认为是对内容共享和本地服务盛行的有效回应。为了确保其优势，内容请求者（CR）应该决定从哪个内容提供商（CP）获得所需的内容。而且，没有CP将免费提供内容；因此，应该给予激励以激励CP。在这项工作中，我们利用金钱激励解决了内容交付问题。特别地，每个CP仅将内容的一部分发送给CR以减少能量消耗。同时，随着移动社交网络的普及，我们引入了社交联系以提高激励效率。具体来说，考虑由CR和CP组成的两层体系结构，引入了Stackelberg游戏模型来对内容交付进行建模。CR担任领导者，并决定货币激励。CP作为关注者，并决定所提供内容的比例。然后给出了Stackelberg均衡的表达式，设计了基于Stackelberg博弈的内容交付与定价算法，通过有限时间迭代收敛到Stackelberg均衡。仿真结果为其有效性提供了证据。设计了基于Stackelberg博弈的内容交付和定价算法，以通过有限时间迭代收敛到Stackelberg均衡。仿真结果为其有效性提供了证据。设计了基于Stackelberg博弈的内容交付和定价算法，以通过有限时间迭代收敛到Stackelberg均衡。仿真结果为其有效性提供了证据。