With the increasing adoption of blockchain technology, there is a strong need for achieving interoperability between unconnected ledgers. Approaches such as hash time lock contracts (HTLCs) have arisen for cross-chain asset exchange. The solution embraces the likelihood of transaction failure and attempts to "make the best out of worst" by allowing transacting agents to at least keep their original assets in case of an abort. Nonetheless, as an undesired outcome, reoccurring transaction failures prompt a critical and analytical examination of the protocol. In this study, we propose a game-theoretic framework to study the strategic behaviors of agents taking part in cross-chain atomic swaps implemented with HTLCs. We study the success rate of the transaction as a function of the swap rate, the token price and its volatility, as well as other variables. We demonstrate that both agents might decide not to follow the protocol in an attempt to exploit price variations so as to maximize one's own utility. An extension of our model confirms that collateral deposits can improve the transaction success rate, and motivates further research towards collateralization without a trusted third party.

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HTLC跨链原子交换的博弈论分析

随着区块链技术的日益普及，迫切需要实现未连接的分类账之间的互操作性。诸如哈希时间锁定合同（HTLC）之类的方法已经出现，用于跨链资产交换。该解决方案包含了交易失败的可能性，并尝试通过允许事务处理代理程序在中止情况下至少保留其原始资产来“尽最大可能”。但是，作为不希望的结果，重复发生的事务失败提示对该协议进行了严格的分析性检查。在这项研究中，我们提出了一个博弈论框架，以研究参与以HTLC实现的跨链原子交换的特工的战略行为。我们研究交易成功率与掉期率，代币价格及其波动性的关系，以及其他变量。我们证明了这两个代理可能决定不遵循该协议，以试图利用价格变化来最大化自己的效用。我们对模型的扩展证实，抵押存款可以提高交易成功率，并且可以推动在没有可信任第三方的情况下进行抵押的进一步研究。